The report demonstrates that MASAK’s role in criminal investigations has, at times, evolved from that of an auxiliary body examining financial data into a mechanism that generates criminal allegations.

MASAK’s primary function is to examine suspicious financial transactions, analyse money flows, and report matters requiring further investigation to the public prosecutor’s office. However, MASAK is neither a court nor a prosecutorial authority or an officially appointed expert body. It therefore cannot conclusively determine that a transaction constitutes a criminal offence, that funds are derived from criminal activity, or that an individual acted with criminal intent.

The report identifies the following key concerns:

• “Suspicious transactions” reported by banks may be treated as evidence of a crime without being corroborated by independent evidence.
• Ordinary bank transfers, commercial payments, corporate relationships, and social connections may be taken out of context and presented as a “criminal network.”
• Instead of tracing the proceeds of a specific crime, individuals may first be selected as targets and a criminal narrative subsequently constructed from their financial and social relationships.
• The fact that one person is under investigation may result in others who have financial or commercial dealings with that person also being treated as suspects.
• Expressions indicating mere possibility—such as “noteworthy,” “requiring clarification,” or “possibly carried out in an organised manner”—may be transformed into definitive allegations at the prosecution stage.
• Although the state is required to prove that funds originate from criminal activity, the burden of proof may effectively be reversed by requiring the suspect to establish that the funds are legitimate.

The report illustrates this methodology through the statement given by Alihan Kuriş during an investigation into the community commonly known as the “Süleymancılar.” In the case examined, ordinary commercial transactions—such as POS revenues received by retail companies, meal-card payments, transfers to suppliers, tax payments, and social security contributions—were portrayed as suspicious. However, the authorities did not concretely establish which invoices were fraudulent, which goods had not been delivered, which funds originated from which criminal offence, or how the individual had participated in the transactions with criminal intent.

The report also finds that:

• The company’s increased transaction volume during a period of high inflation was treated as grounds for suspicion.
• The individual was questioned about transactions carried out in the years after he had transferred his shares.
• Connections with approximately fifty individuals and more than thirty companies were presented as though they demonstrated involvement in a criminal organisation.
• The MASAK data contained serious mathematical inconsistencies, including overall totals lower than the amounts recorded for a single year.

The report’s central conclusion is as follows:

Tracing the proceeds of crime is a duty of the rule-of-law state. However, selecting individuals first and then attempting to extract evidence of criminality from their ordinary economic and social relationships is not crime detection; it is crime production.

MASAK reports should not, by themselves, be regarded as sufficient grounds for pre-trial detention, the seizure of assets, or conviction. Every transaction must be corroborated by independent evidence regarding its legal basis, commercial context, timing, the individual’s authority or involvement, and criminal intent.